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SHORING UP THE HEAR ACT:
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL
LEGISLATION DESIGNED TO ASSIST HEIRS AND
CLAIMANTS OF NAZI-LOOTED ART
Alexander Hull*
“You ask, did they kill? Yes, they killed. They killed for art, when it
suited them. So killing Jews and confiscating art somehow went
together.”
1
INTRODUCTION
From 1933 to 1945, Nazi German forces executed a mass
campaign of property confiscation, stealing as many as 600,000
pieces of art, including paintings, tapestries, and sculptures from
museums and private collections across Europe.
2
Scholar Michael J.
Bazyler referred to this campaign as the “greatest displacement of
art in human history.”
3
It is estimated that some 300,000 pieces of
art are still missing or are currently in the possession of someone
other than the so-called “true” owner, based on reviews of Nazi
documentation conducted by the Jewish Restitution Organization.
4
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2020; B.A., Kenyon College, 2011.
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1
Gaby Wood, Arts: Profits and Loss, GUARDIAN, Feb. 14, 1998, at 6.
2
MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR
RESTITUTION INAMERICA’S COURTS 202 (2003).
3
Id.
4
Khorri Atkinson, Cornyn, Cruz Push for Recovery of Nazi-Stolen Artwork,
TEX. TRIBUNE (June 7, 2016, 4:00 PM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2016/06/07/cornyn-cruzs-bill-seeks-recover-nazi-
stolen-art/.
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While Nazi art looting has been regarded as “dehumanizing,”
5
“self-advancing”
6
and concomitant with the Nazi regime’s larger
genocidal crusade,
7
restitution in this context has been framed as a
means of rehumanization.
8
Through this lens, restitution “re-
establish[es] an almost unbelievable historical lineage”
9
between
heirs and victims, though the process of unearthing these lineages
may reify past horrors and privilege “capitalistic, property-based
understandings of rights”
10
over questions of cultural identity or
more holistic reconciliatory processes, like truth-finding
commissions or healing processes.
11
Nevertheless, restitution
retains an almost visceral significance and allure. Its relevance in the
American cultural milieu has only grown in recent years with the
release of popular movies like The Monuments Men
12
and Woman
5
Thérèse O’Donnell, The Restitution of Holocaust Looted Art and
Transitional Justice: The Perfect Storm or the Raft of the Medusa?, 22 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 49, 53 (2011).
6
Id.
7
See BAZYLER, supra note 2 (“You ask, did they kill? Yes, they killed. They
killed for art, when it suited them. So killing Jews and confiscating art somehow
went together.” (quoting an heir of a murdered Holocaust victim whose art was
stolen)).
8
Israel Singer,Why Now?, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 421, 426 (1998).
9
See O’Donnell, supra note 5, at 49, 56.
10
Id. at 53.
11
Id. at 50. Professor O’Donnell compellingly notes that “court-bound
adversarialism” may limit the laudable goals of restitution in the Nazi-looted art
context. Oftentimes, the heirs of an unknowing, good-faith purchaser of stolen art
find themselves pitted against heirs of Holocaust victims, making it so that both
sides have a plausible stake to victimhood, albeit of different varieties. In making
the case for a more central role for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms like
the New York Holocaust Claims Processing Office and the UK Spoliation
Advisory Panel, Professor O’Donnell identifies mediation’s “untapped potential
to be a more effective handmaiden of reconciliation.” Id. Nothing in this Note
seeks to abnegate or limit any of O’Donnell’s suggestions, which are important
and persuasive.
12
See Press Release, Studio Babelsberg, THE MONUMENTS MEN,
Directed by and Starring George Clooney, Begins Production in Germany, Studio
Babelsburg (Mar. 6, 2013) (on file with author) (describing the plot of The
Monuments Men, a film based on the true story of a World War II platoon
comprised of museum directors and art historians tasked with rescuing artworks
from Nazi looters and returning them to their rightful owners).
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in Gold,
13
the latter of which told the story of Maria Altmann, a
Jewish refugee.
14
As a young woman, Altmann was forced to flee
Vienna to avoid Nazi persecution
15
and eventually used a judgment
from the United States Supreme Court
16
to regain five of her uncle’s
paintings in an Austrian arbitration proceeding some sixty years
later.
17
Woman in Gold highlights a particularly stunning win for heirs
of Holocaust victims seeking restitution,
18
but the reality is that
successes like Altmann’s are rare.
19
Many claimants seeking
restitution face significant legal hurdles in litigating their claims,
both in the United States and elsewhere around the world.
20
These
challenges are myriad: statutes of limitations
21
—which vary state to
13
See Michael Hoenig, Litigating the Return of Nazi-Looted Art, N.Y. L.J.
(Oct. 5, 2018, 2:40 PM),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/10/05/litigating-the-return-of-
nazi-looted-art/.
14
Pete Hammond, ‘Woman in Gold’ Review: Helen Mirren, Ryan Reynolds
A Great Pair in Remarkable Story, DEADLINE (Mar. 30, 2015, 3:59 PM),
https://deadline.com/2015/03/woman-in-gold-movie-review-helen-mirren-ryan-
reynolds-pete-hammond-1201401297/.
15
Id.
16
See generally Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004)
(discussing how an heiress of valuable art sued the Republic of Austria and its
national art gallery for return of certain paintings allegedly expropriated by
Austria following World War II; heiress was successful in reclaiming the
paintings after the Supreme Court denied Austria’s motion to dismiss suit under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, permitting heiress to continue her action).
17
The Recovery of Nazi-Looted Art: The Bloch-Bauer Klimt Paintings, U.
CAL. TELEVISION (June 16, 2016), https://www.uctv.tv/shows/The-Recovery-of-
Nazi-Looted-Art-The-Bloch-Bauer-Klimt-Paintings-28044 (“Los Angeles
attorney E. Randol Schoenberg presents an illustrated talk” discussing how a
Supreme Court judgment permitted Maria Altmann to regain her uncle’s painting
in a later arbitration proceeding.).
18
See Hoenig, supra note 13 (citing the Woman in Gold saga as a pointed
example of some challenges claimants face in reclaiming looted art).
19
HEAR Act Signed into Law, COMMISSION FOR ART RECOVERY (Mar. 7,
2018), http://www.commartrecovery.org/hear-act.
20
Hoenig, supra note 13.
21
By its language, the HEAR Act supplants both state and federal statutes
of limitations. The legislature’s decision to include within its ambit federal
statutes of limitations is more likely an act of cautious over-inclusiveness than
anything else; states typically dominate in areas of property, statutes of limitations
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state—might have already expired, thereby dealing a fatal
procedural blow to a claimant’s recovery;
22
equitable defenses such
as laches (too long a delay in bringing a restitution claim) block
recovery;
23
jurisdictional issues may complicate proceedings, as
many of the preceding changes in possession (theft, illicit sales,
transfers under duress, good-faith purchases)
24
may have occurred
outside the United States;
25
or choice-of-law principles that favor application of
the law of a foreign state [hinder] one’s ability to
recover; [as may], perhaps, a defense in the Act of
State doctrine when a foreign government agency or
commission would deny the claim[; o]r, maybe, the
claimant’s recollection of events is fuzzy or proof of
an ancestor[’]s[] ownership or entitlement is hard to
come by for practical reasons caused by the passage
of time.
26
The Altmann saga highlighted and laid bare many of these
challenges into one case.
27
But Altmann’s role as a sympathetic
governing property disputes, replevin, laches, and the like. For these reasons, this
Note focuses on state involvement in property disputes (and related preemption
concerns), but it is necessary to point out that the HEAR Act seeks to be all-
encompassing and always applicable for Nazi-looted art, regardless of whether
the statute of limitations relevant to a particular case flows from state or federal
law. Holocaust Expropriated Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 2,
130 Stat. 1524, 1524–25 (2016).
22
See, e.g., Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592
F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010).
23
See generally Bakalar v. Vavra, 500 F. App’x 6 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding
that the defendants’ laches defense was sufficient because plaintiffs’ ancestors
were aware of—or should have been aware of—their potential claim to the
contested drawing but had not been diligent in pursuing that claim).
24
Hoenig, supra note 13.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
[S]ixty years after fleeing Vienna, Maria Altmann (Helen
Mirren), an elderly Jewish woman, attempts to reclaim family
possessions that were seized by the Nazis. Among them is a
famous portrait of Maria’s beloved Aunt Adele: Gustave
Klimt’s “Portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer I.” With the help of
young lawyer Randy Schoenberg (Ryan Reynolds), Maria
embarks upon a lengthy legal battle to recover this painting and
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plaintiff in an easily-understood narrative; the stunning value of the
works of art in question;
28
along with the vocal support
29
of Helen
Mirren
30
and Ambassador Ronald S. Lauder, Chairman of the
Commission for Art Recovery (“CAR”), all fomented enough
interest and political will in Congress to pass the Holocaust
Expropriated Art Recovery Act (the “HEAR Act” or “Act”) with
unanimous support in the Senate in December 2016.
31
President
Obama signed the bill into law on December 16, 2016.
32
The HEARAct seeks to “ensure that claims to artwork and other
property
33
stolen or misappropriated by the Nazis are not unfairly
barred by statutes of limitations but are resolved in a just and fair
manner.”
34
The Act temporarily replaces state statutes of limitations
several others, but it will not be easy, for Austria considers them
national treasures.
Woman in Gold, ROCHESTER CITY NEWSPAPER,
https://www.rochestercitynewspaper.com/rochester/woman-in-
gold/Film?oid=2511286 (last visited Aug 19, 2019). See generally Republic of
Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (discussing how an heiress of valuable
art sued the Republic of Austria and its national art gallery for return of certain
paintings allegedly expropriated by Austria following World War II; heiress was
successful in reclaiming the paintings after the Supreme Court denied Austria’s
motion to dismiss suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
28
See Eileen Kinsella, Gold Rush, ARTNEWS (Jan. 1, 2007, 12:00 AM),
http://www.artnews.com/2007/01/01/gold-rush/ (“Collectively the five restituted
works reaped more than $327 million.”).
29
Mirren played the role of Maria Altmann in Woman in Gold. Hammond,
supra note 14.
30
HEAR Act Signed into Law, supra note 19.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
The Act defines “artwork or other property” as:
(A) pictures, paintings, and drawings; (B) statuary art and
sculpture; (C) engravings, prints, lithographs, and works of
graphic art; (D) applied art and original artistic assemblages and
montages; (E) books, archives, musical objects and manuscripts
(including musical manuscripts and sheets), and sound,
photographic, and cinematographic archives and mediums; and
(F) sacred and ceremonial objects and Judaica.
Holocaust Expropriated Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 4, 130
Stat. 1524, 1526 (2016).
34
Id. § 3.
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by creating a uniform six-year statute of limitations for cases
involving artwork or other property lost because of persecution
during the Nazi era.
35
It includes in its ambit previous cases that
were dismissed or barred based on the expiration of state or federal
statutes of limitations and where final judgments had not been
entered prior to dismissal.
36
The Act applies: (1) to claims that were
pending on the day that the HEAR Act was enacted, including all
actions for which the time to file an appeal had not yet expired, and
(2) to all actions filed after enactment but before the Act sunsets on
January 1, 2027.
37
In effect, this extends the time in which claims
can be brought; it permits individuals who lost art between 1933 and
1945 because of Nazi persecution to sue within six years of the time
they discover the identity and location of the artwork and the
claimant’s possessory interest.
38
However, the Act by its language
does not apply to restitution claims barred on the day before
enactment by a federal or state statute of limitations if:
(1) the claimant or a predecessor-in-interest of the
claimant had knowledge of the elements [namely, of
(a) the identity and location of the artwork or other
property, and (b) a possessory interest of the claimant
in the artwork or other property] on or after January
35
Section 5 of the Holocaust Expropriated Recovery Act of 2016, Statute of
Limitations, provides that:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal or State law
or any defense at law relating to the passage of time, and except
as otherwise provided in this section, a civil claim or cause of
action against a defendant to recover any artwork or other
property that was lost during the covered period because of Nazi
persecution may be commenced not later than [six] years after
the actual discovery by the claimant or the agent of the claimant
of (1) the identity and location of the artwork or other property;
and (2) a possessory interest of the claimant in the artwork or
other property.
Id. § 5.
36
HEAR Act Signed into Law, supra note 19.
37
Any civil claim or cause of action to recover artwork or other property
commenced on or after the sunset date will be subject to any applicable federal or
state statute of limitations, as well as any other defense relating to the passage of
time. See Holocaust Expropriated Recovery Act of 2016 § 5(g).
38
Reif v. Nagy, 80 N.Y.S.3d 629, 635 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018).
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1, 1999; and (2) not less than [six] years have passed
from the date such claimant or predecessor-in-
interest acquired such knowledge and during which
time the civil claim or cause of action was not barred
by a Federal or State statute of limitations.
39
The Congressional Research Service’s
40
summary of the HEAR Act
explains that the “statutory limitation period of six years after actual
discovery [of the identity and location of the artwork and a
possessory interest in the artwork] preempts any other statutes of
limitation or defenses relating to the passage of time.”
41
The
operative word here is preempts, which signals Congress’ intent that
the Act expressly preempt each state’s particular statute of
limitations in the specific area of Nazi-confiscated art, such that
under the nationwide statute of limitations, “original owners or their
heirs have six years from enactment in which to sue to reclaim
artwork after discovery of its origins.”
42
One legal commentator, William Charron, has cast doubt on the
law’s constitutionality because it “offers purely procedural
preemption of the states’ . . . statutes of limitations . . . without
creating any substantive federal cause of action or form of relief.”
43
Other observers have voiced additional concerns about the HEAR
Act; they note the law’s potential to actually limit the number of
claims that are timely in states that already have more claimant-
friendly statutes of limitations than what the HEAR Act now offers
in preemption.
44
Such critics also point out that the final text of the
39
Holocaust Expropriated Recovery Act of 2016 § 5.
40
“The Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress
works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal
analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of
party affiliation.” Glossary, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/help/legislative-glossary/#glossary_crs (last visited
Aug. 19, 2019).
41
Holocaust Expropriated Recovery Act of 2016 § 5.
42
Hoenig, supra note 13.
43
William L. Charron, The Problem of Purely Procedural Preemption
Presented by the Federal Hear Act, 2018 PEPP. L. REV. 19, 25 (2018).
44
See, e.g., Simon Frankel & Sari Sharoni, More Uncertainty on Nazi-Era
Art Restitution Claims, LAW360 (Oct. 4, 2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/970980/more-uncertainty-on-nazi-era-art-
restitution-claims (noting that in New York, which has a unique “demand and
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HEAR Act excised earlier drafts’ explicit restriction of the use of
laches as a defense against plaintiffs,
45
indicating that Congress did
not intend to discard laches as a possible defense in cases in this
area.
46
This Note acknowledges these arguments and responds with a
slate of proposed amendments to the current language of the HEAR
Act, all of which are designed to shore up the Act’s constitutionality
should it be challenged in court, while ensuring that the law
continues to be aligned with its original intent—to resolve these
complex suits on their merits in a just and fair manner whenever
possible.
47
Specifically, this Note argues for a federal cause of action
to be developed in concert with the HEAR Act that would sidestep
the aforementioned procedural preemption concerns.
48
This Note
further proposes that a version of New York State’s more claimant-
friendly “demand and refusal” statute of limitations replace the
HEAR Act’s six-year uniform statute of limitations
49
such that it
continue to preempt state statutes of limitations in this area and
cement the United States as a preferred forum in which claimants
can seek restitution of Nazi-confiscated art for the foreseeable
future.
Part I of this Note will explore the HEAR Act’s legislative
history and intent while providing background information
regarding the structure of the HEAR Act. Part II will review recent
cases involving Nazi-confiscated art and examine how the passage
of the HEARAct has changed courts’ approach to some of the issues
that plaintiffs confront when they bring restitution claims
concerning Nazi-confiscated art. This will include a discussion of
refusal” rule under which the statute of limitations clock starts running when a
claimant makes a demand for the return of property and the possessor refuses such
demand, fewer claims may be considered timely if courts find the HEAR Act to
preempt this claimant-friendly state law); see also infra Part III.
45
See id.
46
The Senate Report on the HEAR Act notes that the bill was amended in
the Senate to remove “the reference precluding the availability of equitable
defenses and the doctrine of laches.” S. REP. NO. 114-394, at 6–7 (2016).
47
See id. at 8.
48
See Charron, supra note 43, at 25.
49
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214 (McKinney 1996).
246 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
Reif v. Nagy,
50
the first case to lean heavily on the HEAR Act’s
legislative intent,
51
allowing a plaintiff-claimant to reclaim stolen art
from a defendant’s collection.
52
Part II will also survey other cases
decided in the wake of the HEAR Act’s passage which either make
reference to the HEAR Act or draw comment because they do not.
Part III will contrast the HEAR Act’s discovery rule for chattels
with New York State’s demand and refusal rule for similar property
claims. It will then put forth a hypothetical case in which the use of
the HEAR Act’s preempting discovery rule might be less claimant-
friendly than New York’s demand and refusal rule, thereby
demonstrating a need for the HEAR Act to adopt by amendment a
version of New York’s demand and refusal rule.
Part IV will address concerns about the Act’s constitutionality
from a procedural standpoint. Specifically, Part IV will
acknowledge that nothing in Article I of the Constitution grants
Congress the right to change state rules of procedure. Nevertheless,
courts have held that state procedure alone cannot defeat a federally
50
See generally Reif v. Nagy, 106 N.Y.S.3d 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)
(holding that heirs of a Jewish art collector who died after imprisonment in a Nazi
concentration camp were entitled to summary judgment on their conversion and
replevin claims against an art dealer who had possession of two artworks owned
by the collector, because the imprisoned collector did not relinquish his property
voluntarily when he signed away power of attorney to the collection under duress
when he was already under Nazi control, and, therefore, any subsequent transfer
of the artworks did not convey legal title; also holding that laches was not a bar
to the heirs’ claims to the artworks because the dealer acquired both pieces in
2013 and was on notice of the heirs’ claims to the collector’s artworks prior to the
purchase).
51
See Webster D. McBride et al., Surprise Decision in Reif v. Nagy Raises
as Many Questions as It Answers, HUGHES HUBBARD & REED (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://www.hhrartlaw.com/2018/04/surprise-decision-in-reif-v-nagy-raises-as-
many-questions-as-it-answers/#.
Justice Ramos used the Act’s passage as a blunt instrument to
invalidate any precedential value of Bakalar [v. Vavra, 500 F.
App’x 6 (2d Cir. 2012)]: “The [HEAR Act] was only made into
law in 2016. To the extent that [D]efendants rely on judicial
findings relating to claims or defenses articulated in [Bakalar],
such discussion is irrelevant.”
Id. (quoting Reif v. Nagy, 80 N.Y.S.3d 629, 633 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018)).
52
Id.
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created cause of action.
53
In its Conclusion, this Note will propose
that the HEAR Act be amended to include a federal cause of action
for claimants seeking restitution of art they claim was looted or
misappropriated by the Nazis, so as to ward off the potential that the
law, if challenged, be found unconstitutional.
I. LEGALUNDERPINNINGS OF THEHEARACT AND THENEED FOR
FEDERAL INTERVENTION: WASHINGTON PRINCIPLES AND
VON SAHER
The resurgence of restitution’s importance in popular culture
and the concomitant passage of the HEAR Act were preceded by
important governmental recommitments regarding Nazi-confiscated
art.
54
Those recommitments came first in the form of the
Washington Principles, a list of eleven non-binding principles
ratified by forty-five nations in 1998, which outlined those
countries’ abiding interest in resolving issues relating to Nazi-
confiscated art and creating legal environments that encourage the
identification and restitution of such art.
55
International
53
See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988) (“Since the
procedural rules of its courts are surely matters on which a State is competent to
legislate, it follows that a State may apply its own procedural rules to actions
litigated in its courts.”); Felder v. Casey 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988) (“No one
disputes the general and unassailable proposition . . . that States may establish the
rules of procedure governing litigation in their own courts.”).
54
The Holocaust Expropriated Recovery Act (“HEAR Act”) surveys a brief
history of Nazi art confiscation duringWorldWar II and then proceeds to describe
the United States’ participation in various legislative and international efforts
focused on creating legal avenues for restituting Nazi-confiscated art to rightful
heirs and owners, including its convening of the Washington Conference, passage
of the Holocaust Victims Redress Act and its participation in the Holocaust Era
Assets Conference in Prague in 2009, which concluded by issuing the Terezin
Declaration—a landmark international statement that calls for nations to facilitate
fair solutions with regard to Nazi-confiscated art and ensure that claims are
resolved on their merits whenever possible. SeeHolocaust Expropriated Recovery
Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 2, 130 Stat. 1524, 1524–25 (2016).
55
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Washington Conference
Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, U.S. DEP’T STATE (Dec. 3,
1998), http://www.state.gov/washington-conference-principles-on-nazi-
confiscated-art/ [hereinafter Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs,
Washington Conference].
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recommitments were reaffirmed with the Terezin Declaration, a
document jointly issued by forty-six nations in 2009 that urged the
signatories “to ensure that their legal systems or alternative
processes . . . facilitate just and fair solutions with regard to Nazi-
confiscated and looted art . . . [and] make certain that claims to
recover such art are resolved expeditiously . . . based on the facts
and merits of the claims.”
56
The Washington Principles stressed the importance of
identifying Nazi-confiscated art by opening records and archives to
researchers; of directing resources and personnel to facilitate such
identification and publicizing discoveries of art found to have been
looted; and of giving special consideration to “unavoidable gaps or
ambiguities in the provenance in light of the passage of time and the
circumstances of the Holocaust era” in the context of legal fights
over disputed works.
57
While the Principles are non-binding, they
align closely with the values by which organizations like the World
Jewish Restitution Organization (“WJRO”)
58
measure countries’
progress in seeking “restitution of movable artwork and cultural and
religious property plundered from Jews” during the Nazi era.
59
The
Principles are also cited in the Purposes sections of the HEAR Act
itself, as the Act seeks “[t]o ensure that laws governing claims to
Nazi-confiscated art and other property further United States policy
as set forth in the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-
56
Holocaust Expropriated Recovery Act of 2016 § 2; Bureau of European
and Eurasian Affairs, Prague Holocaust Era Assets Conference: Terezin
Declaration, U.S. DEP’T STATE, https://2009-
2017.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/126162.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2019) [hereinafter
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Terezin Declaration].
57
E.g., Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs,Washington Conference,
supra note 55.
58
WJRO represents “world Jewry in pursuing claims for the recovery of
Jewish properties in Europe” (outside of Germany and Austria). WJRO was
established by leading world Jewish organizations “to address the restitution of
Jewish property and to remind the world that the time has come to redress the
enormous material wrongs caused to European Jewry during the Holocaust.” See
About Us, WORLD JEWISH RESTITUTION ORG., https://wjro.org.il/about-
wjro/about-us-our-mission/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2019).
59
WORLD JEWISH RESTITUTION ORG., HOLOCAUST-ERA LOOTED ART: A
WORLD-WIDE PRELIMINARY OVERVIEW 1 (2009),
http://www.claimscon.org/forms/prague/looted-art.pdf.
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Confiscated Art, the Holocaust Victims Redress Act, and the
Terezin Declaration.”
60
Indeed, at the June 2009 Prague Conference on Holocaust Era
Looted Assets, the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against
Germany and the WJRO presented a “World-Wide Preliminary
Overview” on the implementation of the Washington Conference
Principles.
61
Their overview discussed findings that, while Austria,
the Czech Republic, Germany, and the Netherlands had made
“major progress” towards implementing the Washington Principles,
the United States made only “substantial progress,” alongside
Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Norway, Slovakia, Canada, Israel,
Liechtenstein, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
62
The Prague
Conference, according to proponents of the HEARAct, underscored
the necessity of the HEAR Act’s passage because it was clear that
the United States was not creating a legal environment sufficiently
conducive to plaintiff-claimants seeking restitution of Nazi-
confiscated art.
63
President and Legal Counsel of the Commission Art Recovery
Agnes Peresztegi noted the Prague Conference’s findings in her
testimony before the Senate in support of the HEAR Act.
64
She also
mentioned a need for a bill that would ease or eliminate procedural
obstacles to merit-based adjudication of restitution claims (like
statutes of limitations and laches in the area of Nazi-confiscated art);
prevent (further) judicial narrowing of what qualifies as Nazi-looted
art; stop the “unnecessary”
65
shifting of burdens of proof to plaintiff-
claimants; and codify into binding law the non-binding principles
60
Holocaust Expropriated Recovery Act of 2016, § 3.
61
WORLD JEWISH RESTITUTIONORG., supra note 59, at 1.
62
Id. at 6.
63
Holocaust Expropriated Recovery Act of 2016 Act § 2.
64
U.S. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, TESTIMONY OF AGNES
PERESZTEGI COMMISSION FOR ART RECOVERY BEFORE THE SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEES ON THE CONSTITUTION & OVERSIGHT, AGENCY
ACTION, FEDERAL RIGHTS AND FEDERAL COURTS 4 (2016),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-07-
16%20Peresztegi%20Testimony.pdf.
65
Id. at 2.
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outlined in the Washington Principles
66
and the Terezin
Declaration.
67
The HEAR Act was not passed solely in response to the release
of Woman in Gold or Maria Altmann’s legal battle.
68
Indeed, the
HEAR Act makes explicit mention not of the Altmann case but of
another case, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art,
69
which
invalidated a California state law that “extended the State statute of
limitations for claims seeking recovery of” Nazi-confiscated art.
70
In 2002, California enacted its Civil Procedure Code’s section
354.3, a provision that effectively eliminated its own statute of
limitations for restitutions claims for “Holocaust-era artwork,”
defined as any “article of artistic significance taken as a result of
Nazi persecution during the period of 1929 to 1945.”
71
The Ninth
Circuit struck down this law, finding that because the recovery of
Nazi-confiscated art “affects the international art market, as well as
foreign affairs,” it is a field “occupied exclusively by the federal
government” that does not “justify California’s intrusion.”
72
Writing
for the majority, Circuit Senior Judge Thompson found that the
California legislature effectively created a “world-wide forum for
the resolution of Holocaust restitution claims”
73
and thus could
assert “no serious claim to be addressing a ‘traditional state
responsibility,’” thereby making the statute “subject to a field
preemption analysis.”
74
In effect, the court, in striking down the
statute, reserved this legislative field for the federal government,
66
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs,Washington Conference, supra
note 55.
67
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Terezin Declaration, supra note
56.
68
See Hammond, supra note 14.
69
Holocaust Expropriated Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 2,
130 Stat. 1524, 1524–25 (2016). See generally Von Saher v. Norton Simon
Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 967–68 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding a
California law unconstitutional because it sought to preempt the foreign affairs
doctrine in that it applied to museums displaying looted art located outside of the
state).
70
Holocaust Expropriated Recovery Act of 2016 § 2.
71
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.3 (West 2019).
72
Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 967–68.
73
Id. at 965.
74
Id.
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even though Congress had not yet expressly acted to alter statutes of
limitations with regard to Nazi-confiscated art—deemed by the Von
Saher court to be a field of foreign affairs—and would not do so
until the passage of the HEAR Act.
75
The Von Saher decision has been the subject of heavy
criticism.
76
The dissent argued that the statute at issue should have
been subject to conflict preemption analysis instead of field
preemption analysis
77
because the statute did not implicate foreign
affairs or the “federal government’s power to make and resolve
war.”
78
Rather, the dissent argued, California was merely acting
within the scope of its traditional competence to regulate property
over which it has jurisdiction,”
79
assuming that a “reasonable
reading” of the statute “limit[s] the statute to entities subject to the
jurisdiction of the State of California.”
80
Indeed, in Von Saher,
Appellee—the Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena—had
acquired potentially stolen property in 1971, and Appellant—a
private citizen—used the California court system (and a special
75
Congress may preempt state power to regulate in three ways: “by express
statement [(“express preemption”)], by implicit occupation of a regulatory field
[(“field preemption”)], or by implied preclusion of conflicting state regulations
[(“conflict preemption”)].” KATHLEEN SULLIVAN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
290 (19th ed. 2016).
76
See, e.g., Mikka Gee Conway, Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption and
Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum: Complicating the Just and Fair Solution to
Holocaust-Era Art Claims, 28 L. & INEQ. 373, 374 (2010); Bert Demarsin, The
Third Time Is Not Always a Charm: The Troublesome Legacy of a Dutch Art
Dealer - The Limitation and Act of State Defenses in Looted Art Cases, 28
CARDOZOARTS&ENT. L.J. 255, 287–93 (2010).
77
In a conflict preemption analysis, courts ask whether the state law “stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). E.g., Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also SULLIVAN ET AL.,
supra note 75, at 290–91 (“The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive
as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it.” In a field preemption analysis, a court “requires a clear showing
that Congress meant to occupy a field and so displace the states from regulation
on that subject matter” for federal regulation to preempt a similar (and potentially
conflicting) state regulation.).
78
Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 970–71 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
79
Id. at 970.
80
Id.
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statute of limitations because the standard statute of limitations
time-barred the suit) to recover lost property, traditionally an area of
state competence.
81
There is a tension here that merits focus: Nazi-confiscated art
cases are extremely fact-specific—some disputes involve private
individuals,
82
but many involve disputes between private
individuals and European state-owned museums,
83
some of whom
are seeking to recover property conveyed to state museums by
foreign governments.
84
Both of the aforementioned iterations
involving state-owned museums run the risk of implicating the act
of state doctrine.
85
Indeed, the Von Saher majority likely correctly
identified a potential for foreign affairs federal conflict preemption
should California state courts create special statute of limitations
rules for Nazi-confiscated art.
86
At the same time, property adjudication is traditionally an area
of state competence and responsibility.
87
Congress, in passing a
81
Id. at 957, 964 (majority opinion).
82
See, e.g., Reif v. Nagy, 80 N.Y.S.3d 629, 631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018).
83
See, e.g., Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir.
2002).
84
See, e.g., Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art of Pasadena, 897
F.3d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that a museum held good title to artwork
taken by Nazis in World War II and sold by the Dutch government pursuant to a
post-war claims process “[b]ecause the act of state doctrine deem[ed] valid the
Dutch government’s conveyance to [the purchaser]” who resold the works to the
museum).
85
The U.S. Supreme Court defined the act of state doctrine as providing that
“[e]very sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts
of the government of another done within its own territory.” Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897); see also Banco Nacional De Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427–28 (1964) (holding that the scope of the act of state
doctrine must be determined by federal law).
86
See Von Saher, 897 F.3d at 1155–56.
87
The concept of “[t]raditional state responsibility,” according to American
Insurance Association v. Garamendi, provides courts guidance in determining
whether they should apply a field or conflict preemption analysis to a state statute
being challenged in court in the area of foreign affairs:
If a State were simply to take a position on a matter of foreign
policy with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state
responsibility, field preemption might be the appropriate
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separate statute of limitations for Nazi-confiscated art,
88
made an
explicit choice that the potential for foreign affairs implication—
and, therefore, the necessity for federal control—trumped the states’
traditional competence in the field of property dispute resolution.
This policy choice raises two related questions: did Congress make
the right choice? And more crucially, did it make a constitutional
choice?
In response to the first question, it would be difficult to argue
that Congress did not make the morally “right” choice to try to pass
laws designed to make it easier for would-be claimants to reclaim
their property, given the atrocities perpetuated by the Nazi regime
89
and the difficulties claimants have experienced in having their
claims adjudicated in court on their respective merits.
90
Although
Congress arguably made a morally “right” choice by passing such a
law, Congress erred by opting not to create a federal cause of action.
By instead merely “engrafting” a federal statute of limitations on top
of state statutes of limitations specifically for Nazi-looted art,
Congress acted unconstitutionally
91
when it preempted a field of
traditional state responsibility
92
without a larger accompanying
regulatory structure for the adjudication of Nazi-looted art claims.
Congress must, therefore, reform and expand the HEAR Act’s
regulatory structure. These revisions might include a new federal
cause of action, revised elements of proof, or more claimant-friendly
statutes of limitations, all created with the goal of the HEAR Act in
doctrine, whether the National Government had acted and, if it
had, without reference to the degree of any conflict, the
principle having been established that the Constitution entrusts
foreign policy exclusively to the National Government.
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419 n.11 (2003).
88
Katie Gerlach Merrill, A Proposed Uniform Statute of Limitations for
Nazi-Plundered Art and Cultural Property, HUGHESHUBBARD&REED (July 11,
2016), https://www.hhrartlaw.com/2016/07/a-proposed-uniform-statute-of-
limitations-for-nazi-plundered-art-and-cultural-property/.
89
See BAZYLER, supra note 2.
90
See, e.g., Von Saher, 897 F.3d at 1155–56.
91
See generally Charron, supra note 43 (“The HEARAct . . . embraces state
causes of action and all of their various substantive provisions and elements of
proof, and [it] imposes a federal limitations period for claims brought during the
next ten years.” (citation omitted)).
92
See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 420 (2003).
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mind—to assist claimants in their quests to adjudicate restitution
claims on their merits.
93
II. RECENTNEWYORKCASES: THEHEARACT’SUNCERTAIN AND
LIMITED IMPACT INCASES OF PLAINTIFFSCONFRONTING
LEGAL OR PROCEDURAL IMPEDIMENTSBEYOND EXPIRED
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
The HEAR Act may be starting to play a more impactful role in
cases where plaintiffs seek restitution of Nazi-confiscated art, but
because it affects statutes of limitations only, its impact is limited in
cases where plaintiffs face impediments to recovery beyond running
of statutes of limitations.
94
Further, thus far the law has largely failed
to provide much-needed certainty in the Nazi-looted art context.
95
Indeed, Thomas Kline, a lawyer who specializes in recovering
stolen art and cultural property, noted that the “lack of standards” in
this area creates “restitution roulette”—a situation that likely
discourages suits and creates confusion and unpredictability for
would-be claimants.
96
Beyond introducing more uncertainty, the HEAR Act falls short
of its stated intent by failing to disturb longstanding, near-
93
Holocaust Expropriated Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 5,
130 Stat. 1524, 1526–28 (2016).
94
See generally Hulton v. Bayerische Staatsgemaldesammlungen, 346 F.
Supp. 3d 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (making no references to HEAR Act and holding
that plaintiff did not sufficiently allege a government “taking” by the German
State of Bavaria, as required for plaintiffs to invoke the “takings” exception to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (“FSIA”), which immunizes acts of foreign
governments within their own borders from external restitution claims).
95
Jason Barnes, Note, Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of
2016: A Federal Reform to State Statutes of Limitations for Art Restitution
Claims, 56 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 593, 635 (2018).
96
Patricia Cohen & Graham Bowley, Dispute Over Nazi Victim’s Art, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/25/arts/design/
christies-and-sothebys-differ-on-handling-of-2-schieles.html (quoting Monica
Dugot, international director of restitution at Christie’s: “These issues are
extraordinarily complicated because there are no set rules and we don’t know
definitely what happened in many cases . . . . We have to be in a position where
we can be sure we can convey good title to works in our sales.”).
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unassailable choice of law analyses
97
and foreign immunity and/or
act of state doctrines,
98
as demonstrated in recent New York state
court cases.
99
That said, the recent case of Reif v. Nagy potentially
opens a new front in claimants’ battle for restitution, provided
certain facts are on a plaintiff’s side, as judges in Reif explicitly
sought to recognize and honor the stated intent of the HEAR Act’s
passage by redefining and expanding the concept of coercive
transfers of property in the Nazi era.
100
A. Reif: Redefining Transfers Under Duress
An examination of Reif alongside Bakalar v. Vavra is instructive
because both cases involve claimants in New York state courts
attempting to recover works from the same collection.
101
In theory,
since the original moment of potential breakage in the line of good-
faith provenance was the same in these two cases, one might expect
similar legal outcomes.
102
Indeed, the only clear difference between
the two cases is that the HEAR Act was passed between the time
97
See Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 307 F. Supp. 3d 304 (S.D.N.Y.
2018) (making no mention of HEAR Act’s recent passage while engaging in
thorough choice of law analysis between Italian and New York law). But see
Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186, 197 (2d Cir. 2019) (affirming
the aforementioned Zuckerman decision on appeal, but specifically noting that the
HEAR Act, by its amended language, left open the option for defendants to assert
laches and other equitable defenses: “The HEAR [A]ct does not prevent
defendants from asserting a laches defense.”).
98
See Hulton, 346 F. Supp. 3d at 551.
99
See, e.g., Bakalar v. Vavra, 500 F. App’x 6 (2d Cir. 2012); Hulton, 346 F.
Supp. 3d 546; Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 3d 304; Reif v. Nagy, 106 N.Y.S.3d 5
(N.Y. App. Div. 2019); Reif v. Nagy, 80 N.Y.S.3d 629 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018).
100
SeeMcBride et al., supra note 51.
101
William Cohan, A Suit Over Schiele Drawings Invokes New Law on Nazi-
Looted Art, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/arts/design/a-suit-over-schiele-drawings-
invokes-new-law-on-nazi-looted-art.html (quoting Defendant Nagy’s attorney,
who referred to the Reif case as “Bakalar 2,” saying, “It’s the same case being
brought by these heirs and their counsel over the exact same art collection, so the
case shouldn’t go forward.”).
102
Id.
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that Bakalar was decided in 2012 and Reif was decided in 2019.
103
This single difference proved critical.
In Reif, the HEAR Act pivotally cut through the uncertain and
difficult issues of provenance that thwarted the same claimants in
Bakalar.
104
Both cases concerned the rights of heirs to works of art
by expressionist artist Egon Schiele,
105
which prior to 1938 were
owned by an Austrian cabaret singer and art collector of Jewish
descent, Fritz Grünbaum.
106
In 1938, Grünbaum was arrested, and
Nazi agents inventoried his art collection.
107
After he was taken to
the Dachau concentration camp, he was forced to assign his wife
power of attorney over his estate.
108
Grünbaum was murdered at
Dachau shortly thereafter.
109
His wife then likely transferred his art
collection (which would later surface in a Swiss gallery) to a relative
before she too was sent to a concentration camp and subsequently
also murdered.
110
The plaintiff in Bakalar, purchaser in good faith of the
confiscated artwork, sought a declaratory judgment that he was the
rightful owner of a Schiele artwork; defendant heirs of Grünbaum
claimed that the Nazis expropriated the artwork from their ancestor
in 1938 and that title to the artwork was theirs, counterclaiming for
replevin and conversion.
111
The heirs appealed the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York’s decision,
which found for the purchaser after improperly applying Swiss law
to the issue of whether the purchaser acquired title to the artwork.
112
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that, under a
103
See, e.g., Bakalar, 500 F. App’x 6; Reif, 106 N.Y.S.3d 5.
104
Compare Bakalar, 500 F. App’x 6, with Reif, 106 N.Y.S.3d 5.
105
Hoenig, supra note 13; see also Bakalar v. Vavra, 237 F.R.D. 59, 61–62
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that a Nazi agent inventoried Grünbaum’s collection
and reported it to contain eighty-one works by Schiele); Reif v. Nagy, 80
N.Y.S.3d 629, 631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018) (finding the same facts regarding the
Nazi agent’s inventory of Grünbaum’s collection).
106
McBride et al., supra note 51.
107
See id.
108
Reif, 80 N.Y.S.3d at 632.
109
Id.
110
Bakalar v. Vavra, 237 F.R.D. 59, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
111
See Bakalar v. Vavra, 819 F. Supp. 2d 293, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
112
Id.
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proper application of New York law, the burden of proof with
respect to whether an artwork is stolen lies with the possessor.
113
The Second Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment and
remanded the case for further proceedings under New York law
because the district judge improperly placed the burden of proof on
the Grünbaum heirs; after a threshold showing has been made that
the heirs have an arguable claim to the artwork, New York law
places the burden on the current possessor to prove that the artwork
was not stolen.
114
On remand, the court again awarded judgment to
possessor Bakalar and denied the defendant-heirs’ counterclaims,
ruling that laches barred claims of heirs to title to the artwork
because Grünbaum’s heirs made but one “aborted” effort to recover
the property in 1952.
115
The Second Circuit affirmed this ruling in
2011, again on a laches defense.
116
Reif followed Bakalar and held that the relevant Grünbaum heirs
were entitled to summary judgment on their conversion and replevin
claims against an art dealer in possession of two artworks owned by
the heirs’ ancestor.
117
Grünbaum owned the works prior to World
War II, did not voluntarily relinquish the artworks, and only signed
a power of attorney relinquishing title to his wife under duress by
Nazi control.
118
The circumstances were such that no subsequent
transfer of the artworks conveyed legal title.
119
Further, the court
found that laches was not a bar to the heirs’ claims to the artworks
because the dealer acquired both pieces in 2013 and was on notice
of the heirs’ claims to Grünbaum’s artworks prior to his purchase.
120
The Bakalar opinion did not focus on the original moment of
coercion that Reif identified as proof of looting—the moment when
Grünbaum was forced to appoint his wife power of attorney while
already in a concentration camp, which Reif understood to be a
prototypical coercive atmosphere giving rise to credible claims of
113
Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 147 (2d Cir. 2010).
114
Id.
115
See Bakalar, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 306–07.
116
Bakalar v. Vavra, 500 F. App’x 6, 9 (2d Cir. 2012).
117
See Reif v. Nagy, 80 N.Y.S.3d 629, 637 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018).
118
Id. at 631.
119
See id. at 634.
120
See id. at 635.
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contract unenforceability and inability to pass valid title.
121
Instead,
Bakalar focused on the heirs’ lack of diligent efforts to retrieve the
works after the war and ruled not to transfer title of the works based
on a successful laches defense.
122
In 2011, the Southern District of
New York noted that the “only evidence of any effort by any heir to
recover Grünbaum property [was one relative’s] aborted effort to
recover Grünbaum’s music royalties”
123
in 1952. The claimants
tried to argue that the political situation in Czechoslovakia, where
Grünbaum’s sister Elise Zozuli lived at the time and made initial
efforts to claim her brother’s music royalties, would have made such
recovery both “dangerous and virtually impossible,” but their
account of Zozuli’s efforts to claim the music royalties, even
momentarily, was found to militate against the original assertion that
it was too dangerous for Zozuli to make reclamation efforts of any
kind.
124
On the other hand, Justice Ramos writing for the New York
Supreme Court, New York County in Reif found Grünbaum’s
transfer of power of attorney to have been made under duress and
deemed that fact dispositive, noting that “a signature at gunpoint
cannot lead to a valid conveyance,”
125
thereby spoiling the entire
line of good-faith provenance.
126
Justice Ramos made much of the
121
Bakalar v. Vavra, 819 F. Supp. 2d 293, 300–01 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Reif, 80
N.Y.S.3d at 632.
122
See Bakalar, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 307.
123
Id. at 306. Grünbaum was a cabaret artist, and the implication here is that
as author of certain works, he was entitled to royalties on their sales. Bakalar v.
Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 137 (2d. Cir. 2010).
124
Bakalar, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 296, 306.
125
Reif, 80 N.Y.S.3d at 634.
126
See also Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 810 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966)
(holding that relinquishment by owner of work of art in order to flee for life from
Nazi persecution was not voluntary and did not constitute abandonment, and
therefore that no title was conveyed by Nazis who pillaged and plundered painting
as against rightful owner).
Abandonment is defined as a voluntary relinquishment of a
known right . . . with no intent to reclaim. . . . In Collac, it was
held that personal property temporarily abandoned at the
approach of the enemy, without the relinquishment of the
owner’s right of ownership, is neither foreclosed nor forfeited.
The relinquishment here by theMenzels in order to flee for their
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HEAR Act’s passage in the intervening years between the Bakalar
decision and the case before him, noting that its passage “compels
us to help return Nazi-looted art to its heirs.”
127
His opinion also
noted that the HEAR Act instructs courts “to be mindful of the
difficulty of tracing artwork provenance due to the atrocities of the
Holocaust era, and to facilitate the return of property where there is
reasonable proof that the rightful owner is before us.”
128
Reif was a somewhat surprising decision,
129
and not only
because the same plaintiffs had already brought similar claims
regarding art by the same artist from the same collection and lost.
130
The decision was viewed as a surprise because it leaned heavily on
the HEAR Act’s (i.e., Congress’) unilateral decision to widen the
scope of what could be considered Nazi art confiscation.
131
Yet
despite its potential for surprise, Reifwas also affirmed on appeal,
132
giving life to the idea that Justice Ramos’s decision may not have
been an outlier, but may instead signal courts’ increasing
willingness to recognize and honor Congress’ intent in empowering
plaintiffs to reclaim property that previously may have been out of
their reach.
133
Writing for a unanimous bench of judges on the
Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Judge Anil Singh
quotes directly from the “Purposes” section of the HEAR Act in the
conclusion of his decision and then writes, “We are informed by the
lives was nomore voluntary than the relinquishment of property
during a holdup . . . and from the history of their search for the
painting, there was obviously a continuing intent to reclaim.
The court finds, accordingly, as a matter of law, that there was
here no abandonment.
Id.
127
Bakalar v. Vavra, 237 F.R.D. 59, 61–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Reif, 80
N.Y.S.3d at 633.
128
Reif, 80 N.Y.S.3d at 634.
129
McBride et al., supra note 51.
130
Id.
131
See id.
132
Reif v. Nagy, 106 N.Y.S.3d 5, 14 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019).
133
Jason Grant, NY Appeals Court Explains Why Nazi-Stolen Paintings
Belong with Jewish Collector’s Heirs, N.Y. L.J. (July 9, 2019),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/07/09/ny-appeals-court-
explains-why-nazi-stolen-paintings-belong-with-jewish-collectors-
heirs/?slreturn=20190718232901.
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intent and provisions of the HEARAct which highlight[] the context
in which plaintiffs, who lost their rightful property during World
War II, bear the burden of proving superior title to specific property
in an action under the traditional principles of New York law.”
134
The facts of Reif are such that the Nazis never actually took
possession of any of the art in Grünbaum’s collection, though they
did force a transfer under coercive conditions.
135
As one legal
observer inquired, “Is evidence of Nazi persecution leading to a
transfer between family members (neither of whom was aligned
with the Nazis) sufficient, or must there be a showing that the Nazis
or their collaborators themselves ever took possession of the
property in question?”
136
The language of the HEAR Act provides little guidance,
137
and
the accompanying Senate Report confirms that Congress intended
the language to be vague and broad so as to cover a wide range of
claims:
Subsection (5) defines the Nazi persecution that may
cause the loss of art or other cultural property caused
by the bill. It applies to “any persecution of a specific
group of individuals based on Nazi ideology by the
Government of Germany, its allies or agents,
members of the Nazi Party, or their agents and
associates, during the []covered period.” . . . This
definition is intended to be broad, to facilitate the
restitution of art and other cultural property lost
during the covered period.
138
Moreover, the relevant subsection was amended in the Act to be
even broader than the initial language of the bill, replacing an
original requirement that property in question be lost due to “Nazi
persecution . . . based on race, ethnicity, or religion” with the
broader term of “Nazi ideology” during the “covered period.”
139
More curiously, the final language of the bill dropped a technical
134
Reif, 106 N.Y.S.3d at 24 (emphasis added).
135
Reif v. Nagy, 80 N.Y.S.3d 629, 633–34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018).
136
McBride et al., supra note 51.
137
Barnes, supra note 95, at 618.
138
S. REP. NO. 114-394, at 9 (2016).
139
HEAR ACT REVISIONS, SULLIVAN & WORCESTER LLP 3 (2016),
https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/878449/B2079277.pdf.
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definition of the term “unlawfully lost,” which was originally
defined as “any theft, seizure, forced sale, sale under duress, or any
other loss of an artwork or cultural property that would not have
occurred absent persecution during the Nazi era.”
140
By electing not
to precisely define the ways in which property might have been lost
in order to access the privilege of the HEAR Act’s statute of
limitations extension, Congress effectively sacrificed a baseline
level of fact-pattern certainty about which cases qualify for HEAR
Act extension in exchange for claimants’ ability to bring a wider
array of cases to court.
141
Agnes Peresztegi’s Senate testimony is also instructive on this
point: in a footnote to her testimony before the Subcommittee
considering the bill, she declared her hope that the bill cover “any
and all types of dispossession”
142
:
[It] should not matter whether the loss occurred (i)
by a Nazi soldier taking the art from a Jewish
family’s apartment, (ii) by . . . the Nazi art looting
unit . . . (iii) whether the art was sold to pay the so-
called flight-tax, or (iv) was forcefully auctioned off,
or (v) whether a Jewish persecutee has sold the art
below market value while fleeing for his life.
143
Peresztegi even sought to include “cases where the owner sold the
work for consideration during the period of Nazi persecutions,”
144
arguing that a court “should have to determine whether such a sale
was truly voluntary and not coerced in any way, and that a market
price was offered and the consideration was received in a freely
disposable way.”
145
Her last fact pattern is not a mere hypothetical; Zuckerman v.
Metropolitan Museum of Art is a case whose facts track closely to a
situation that might require Peresztegi’s vision of a holistic coercion
analysis for a claimant to successfully reclaim purportedly looted
140
Id.
141
Barnes, supra note 95, at 633.
142
U.S. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 64, at 2 n.3.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
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art.
146
Alice and Paul Leffmann were wealthy German Jews who
owned a large collection of art that included an important work by
Pablo Picasso entitled The Actor, which they had purchased in
1912.
147
In 1937, they fled from Germany “after losing their
business, livelihood, home and most of their possessions due to Nazi
persecution.”
148
In 1938, while in Italy, the Leffmanns sold the
painting “well below its actual value in an effort to gather enough
money to pay for [their] passage out of Italy,” which by then had
also become a dangerous place for Jews to remain.
149
The Actor was
then donated to the Metropolitan Museum of Art in 1952, where it
remains to this day.
150
The Zuckerman court engaged in a protracted choice of law
analysis between Italian and New York law in response to the
Museum’s motion to dismiss on grounds that the plaintiff had failed
to allege duress of the 1938 sale.
151
The court chose to adjudicate
the case under New York law, which requires that the defendant
have caused the duress in the original sale in order to lose good-title
claim to the property in question.
152
Critically, the Museum was not
a party to the 1938 sale, so the duress allegation failed,
153
and the
Museum won its motion to dismiss.
154
Zuckerman illustrates one of the outer limits on the HEAR Act’s
effectiveness in restituting art to heirs of those who sold art under
duress.
155
The HEAR Act is a statute of limitations law; it cannot
disturb courts’ choice of law analyses.
156
But a side-by-side
comparison of Zuckerman and Reif—both cases analyzed under
146
See Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 307 F. Supp. 3d 304, 307
(S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 928 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2019).
147
See id. at 307–08.
148
Id. at 307.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
See id. at 315–16.
152
See id. at 319.
153
Id. at 319–20.
154
Id. at 325.
155
See id.
156
See Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 862 F.3d 951,
964 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that the HEAR Act “does not alter the choice of law
analysis” used to decide which state’s lawwill govern claims of title to the artwork
in question).
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New York law—suggests that the HEAR Act has not yet been
successful in articulating a workable, justiciable standard for when
the HEAR Act should apply and how much help it might provide to
claimants seeking restitution beyond the pure mathematics of the
changed statute of limitations.
157
As cases filter through state and
federal courts in the years before the HEAR Act sunsets, judges will
be left to determine how much (or how little) weight must be given
to the HEAR Act’s stated goal of helping plaintiffs resolve their
restitution claims on the merits.
B. The HEAR Act is Circumscribed By FSIA
Hulton v. Staatsgemaldesammlungen demonstrates another
impediment to successful restitution, even after the HEAR Act’s
passage.
158
That obstacle comes in the form of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), “which provides foreign states
and their agents with a broad grant of immunity,”
159
even in disputes
over property, because courts defer to “the foreign policy of the
political branches” in the FSIA context.
160
In the Nazi restitution
context, when the current owner of the property in question is a state
entity that would normally be afforded FSIA immunity, the burden
is on the plaintiff to show that a so-called takings exception provides
an avenue for restitution in the face of FSIA immunity.
161
The
takings exception to FSIA immunity applies when the plaintiff is
able to show that (a) property was taken in violation of international
law, and (b) that the individual(s) who originally deprived the owner
of the property in question were sufficiently aligned with the Nazi
157
Compare Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 3d 304, with Reif v. Nagy, 80
N.Y.S.3d 629 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018).
158
Hulton v. Bayerische Staatsgemaldesammlungen, 346 F. Supp. 3d 546
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (dismissing restitution claim made by heirs of German Jewish
art dealer against instrumentality of the German State of Bavaria because heirs
had failed to sufficiently allege any government taking, as required to invoke the
“takings” exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
159
Id. at 551 (quoting McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 672 F.3d
1066, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
160
Id. (quoting Sampson v. Fed. Republic of Ger., 250 F.3d 1145, 1155–56
(7th Cir. 2001)).
161
Id. at 549–50.
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regime so as to be considered an agent of that state and were not
acting in their own private capacity; a U.S court can exercise
jurisdiction if the takings exception to FSIA immunity is met.
162
Therefore, private profiteers do not implicate FSIA immunity, as
they are non-state actors.
163
In Hulton, the heirs of Jewish art dealer Alfred Flechtheim
brought suit against the Bavarian State Paintings Collection—a
government institution.
164
In 1933, Flechtheim “was forced to place
his property ‘at the disposal of’ Alfred Schulte, whom plaintiffs
described as a ‘Nazi tax advisor’ who ‘officially took possession of
all of Flechtheim’s belongings and subsequently sold a good deal of
[them] to the benefit of Flechtheim’s German creditors and the Nazi
state’s authorities.’”
165
The court then analyzed the plaintiffs’
characterization of Schulte as a “Nazi tax advisor” who was “well
connected to . . . the Nazi state and its authorities,” but ultimately
found that plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege facts indicating a
takings exception (i.e., that Schulte acted “on behalf of, or at the
direction of, the German government” in order for him to be
considered an agent of the German state when he stole the property);
the court found that FSIA sovereign immunity applied.
166
In holding that plaintiffs failed to show that “Schulte
participated in the government’s campaign against Flechtheim,”
167
the court distinguished the facts in Hulton from two other cases in
which courts allowed similar restitution claims to proceed against
state actors under the FSIA’s takings exception.
168
In Philipp v.
Federal Republic of Germany, the D.C. Circuit permitted a similar
suit to proceed because the plaintiffs successfully proved forced
sales of art to the German State of Prussia engineered and directed
by Hermann Goering, then the Prime Minister of Prussia and a
notorious plunderer of art who preferred “the bizarre pretense of
162
Id.
163
See id. at 549–50; see alsoWilliams v. Nat’l Gallery of Art, London, 16-
CV-6978 (VEC), 2017WL 4221084, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2017) (stating that
“conversion by a private individual is not a FSIA taking”).
164
See Hulton, 346 F. Supp. 3d at 547.
165
Id. at 548.
166
Id. at 550.
167
Id. at 551.
168
Id. at 550.
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‘negotiations’ with and ‘purchase’ from counterparties with little or
no ability to push back without risking their property or their
lives.”
169
Similarly, in Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain,
170
the Ninth
Circuit allowed a suit to proceed under the takings exception
because the court found that the plaintiff-heir’s grandmother was
forced to sell a painting to “an agent of the Nazi government” in
1939
171
under considerable duress.
172
The burden of proof in a Nazi restitution case affected by the
FSIA is high in that it requires plaintiffs to show that the
individual(s) who originally deprived the Jewish owner of the
property were sufficiently aligned with the Nazi regime so as to be
considered an agent of the state, no easy evidentiary task.
173
As a
result of this high burden of proof, plaintiffs may be hard-pressed to
hurdle procedural barriers and get their cases adjudicated on the
underlying merits of their claims. Indeed, many courts have
recognized the high bar that the FSIA poses to claimants.
174
The
Hulton court, in dismissing the complaint, registered its sympathy
to the plaintiffs’ “moral claim” to the paintings by noting that
“[t]here is no doubt that the economic opportunism of men
169
Philipp v. Fed. Republic of Ger., 894 F.3d 406, 407, 409–12 (D.C. Cir.
2018).
170
See generally Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir.
2010) (In a suit where the plaintiff brought action to recover a Nazi-confiscated
painting from a museum owned by the Spanish crown, the expropriation
exception to the FSIA was applicable even though neither the Kingdom of Spain
nor the foundation currently in possession of the painting took the painting from
plaintiff’s grandmother, the original owner.).
171
Id. at 1022; see Isaac Kaplan, 3 Cases That Explain Why Restituting Nazi-
Looted Art Is So Difficult, ARTSY (July 5, 2017, 4:30 AM),
https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-3-cases-explain-restituting-nazi-
looted-art-difficult.
172
Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1023.
173
Hulton v. Bayerische Staatsgemaldesammlungen, 346 F. Supp. 3d 546,
551 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
174
See Sampson v. Fed. Republic of Ger., 250 F.3d 1145, 1155–56 (7th Cir.
2001) (“In interpreting the FSIA, we are mindful that judicial resolution of cases
bearing significantly on sensitive foreign policy matters, like the case before us,
might have serious foreign policy implications which courts are ill-equipped to
anticipate or handle.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also
McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 672 F.3d 1066, 1075 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (characterizing the FSIA exceptions as “narrowly drawn”).
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like . . . Schulte would not have been possible without the Nazi
government’s promulgation of racist laws and genocidal practices
that deprived Jews of the most basic economic and human rights.”
175
But the court went on to note that, although “morally unsatisfying,”
it was forced to rule for defendants based on the broad grant of
immunity provided to foreign states under the FSIA.
176
In doing so,
however, the court went out of its way to suggest that:
[i]t would not be hard to justify and articulate an
exception to the FSIA that created a carve-out for
victims like Flechtheim and his heirs to take action
against the downstream beneficiaries of such
policies. Nevertheless, Congress has chosen not to
enact such an exception, and it is not the [c]ourt’s
proper place to create one, particularly in light of the
“[d]eference to the foreign policy of the political
branches” required in the FSIA context.
177
The HEAR Act, circumscribed by its procedural language
addressing statutes of limitations in relation to Nazi-era confiscated
art, does not––and cannot––disturb choice of law
178
or foreign
sovereign immunity legal doctrines, as Zuckerman andHultonmake
clear.
179
Thus, while Reif demonstrates the outer limits of the HEAR
Act’s power to assist claimants, other recent cases like Zuckerman
and Hulton demonstrate that the HEAR Act in its current form may
not be living up to its stated purpose of “ensur[ing] that claims to
artwork and other property stolen or misappropriated by the Nazis
175
Hulton, 346 F. Supp. 3d at 551.
176
Id.
177
Id. (citing Sampson, 250 F.3d at 1156).
178
See Judith Wallace et al., Enactment of Federal Holocaust Expropriated
Art Recovery (HEAR) Act Expands Opportunities for Claims to Nazi-Confiscated
Art, CARTER LEDYARD & MILLBURN LLP (Jan. 12, 2017),
https://www.clm.com/publication.cfm?ID=5577#_ftnref2 (“Although
Congress’[] stated intention is for these disputes to be decided on the merits,
because of an exception set forth in the law, the new law will not end quarrels
about which state’s law applies.”).
179
Hulton was decided two years after the HEAR Act’s enactment, but the
court does not even mention it once. See id.; see also Zuckerman v. Metro.
Museum of Art, 307 F. Supp. 3d 304, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (failing, like Hulton,
to make mention of HEAR Act).
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are . . . resolved in a just and fair manner”
180
in concert with policy
as set forth in the Washington Principles
181
and the Terezin
Declaration.
182
III. CONTRASTING THEHEARACT’SDISCOVERYRULE WITHNEW
YORK’SDEMAND ANDREFUSALRULE
By its plain, stated language, the HEAR Act procedurally
preempts state statutes of limitations for restitution claims of Nazi-
era misappropriated “artwork or other property,” defined as:
(A) pictures, paintings, and drawings;
(B) statuary art and sculpture;
(C) engravings, prints, lithographs, and works of
graphic art;
(D) applied art and original artistic assemblages and
montages;
(E) books, archives, musical objects and manuscripts
(including musical manuscripts and sheets), and
sound, photographic, and cinematographic archives
and mediums; and
(F) sacred and ceremonial objects and Judaica.
183
New York State has a unique, claimant-friendly “demand and
refusal” rule for stolen chattels, as articulated in New York’s
replevin statute, which provides for a three-year statute of
limitations for recovery of a chattel.
184
As applied to good-faith
purchasers, Guggenheim v. Lubell established that in New York, “a
cause of action for replevin . . . of a stolen chattel accrues when the
true owner makes demand for return of the chattel and the person in
possession of the chattel refuses to return it.”
185
Compared to other
180
Holocaust Expropriated Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 4,
130 Stat. 1524, 1526 (2016).
181
See Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Washington Conference,
supra note 55.
182
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Terezin Declaration, supra
note 56.
183
Id.
184
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214 (McKinney 1996).
185
Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y.
Ct. App. 1991).
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states, where deadlines run only a few years from the time of the
original theft,
186
the New York demand and refusal rule is alluring
for self-evident reasons in the Nazi art context, where original thefts
may have occurred upwards of seventy years ago.
In contrast, the HEAR Act’s discovery rule establishes a
uniform, preemptive, and national statute of limitations that
provides original owners of Nazi-looted art (or their heirs) an
opportunity to bring claims after discovering its (potentially stolen)
origins,
187
but it excludes claims that were not barred by an
applicable state statute of limitations during a six-year period from
1999 to 2016.
188
Presumably, Congress’ intent here was to honor the
legal concept of laches, which defeats claims brought in a dilatory
and unreasonable manner.
189
However, Congress may have
unwittingly created a situation in which the HEAR Act’s passage
could ironically be disadvantageous to claimants seeking restitution
in a court governed by New York law,
190
as it may have
miscalculated the level of difficulty in choice of law analyses in
cases where artwork is bought and sold multiple times, in all kinds
of fraught conditions, breeding multiple plausible choice of law
options for courts.
191
The fact pattern, easily imagined, would be such that a claim
governed by New York law
192
and found not to have been time
barred for a six-year period between 1999 and 2016might fall within
186
Wallace et al., supra note 178.
187
Holocaust Expropriated Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 3,
130 Stat. 1524, 1525–26 (2016).
188
See Frankel & Sharoni, supra note 44 (stating that the HEAR Act’s
legislative history “indicate[s] both that the [A]ct was intended to significantly
limit claims discovered after 1999 but before the [A]ct’s 2016 enactment, and that
the [A]ct was intended to give an opportunity for victims to resuscitate post-1999
claims that would have been barred by statutory limitations in the past.”).
189
Laches, BLACK’SLAWDICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “laches” as
the “equitable doctrine by which a court denies relief to a claimant who has
unreasonably delayed in asserting the claim, when that delay has prejudiced the
party against whom relief is sought.”).
190
See Frankel & Sharoni, supra note 44.
191
Wallace et al., supra note 178.
192
For example, if the last sale or transfer of ownership of the property in
question occurred in New York, and the property has remained in New York ever
since. See Bakalar v. Vavra, 237 F.R.D. 59, 61–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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the aforementioned exception and therefore outside the rescue
“discovery rule” of the HEAR Act.
193
This might happen if the
claimant possessed actual knowledge
194
of the location of the
artwork and the potential claim during the 1999 to 2016 period and
failed to demand its return from the current owner.
195
In effect, the
HEAR Act could bar more claims than might have otherwise been
barred in courts applying New York law without the preempting
HEAR Act operating in the background because the Act preempts
New York’s demand and refusal rule.
196
This is a result that is
plainly contrary to the very purpose of the Act’s passage, which was
to extend statutes of limitations and allow more claims to be heard
on their merits.
197
Currently, no case tests this hypothetical fact pattern, so we do
not know how a New York court applying the HEAR Act statute of
limitations may choose to adjudicate this curious quirk that sows
even more doubt into cases in the restitution context. However,
laches has been preserved as a valid defense in the HEAR Act.
198
Thus, defendants may affirmatively defend a claim of this nature by
arguing that claimants who failed to make demand before the
passage of the HEAR Act (but had knowledge of a potential claim)
cannot bring such claim because they delayed too long, depending
on how long the would-be claimant waited to bring the claim and
whether the delay was reasonable.
199
However, claimants that
193
Wallace et al., supra note 178.
194
Holocaust Expropriated Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 5,
130 Stat. 1524, 1526–28 (2016).
195
Wallace et al., supra note 178.
196
See Frankel & Sharoni, supra note 44.
197
Emerie Huetteman, Senate Bill Would Help Recover Art Stolen by Nazis,
N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/arts/design/senate-bill-would-help-
recover-art-stolen-by-nazis.html.
198
S. REP. NO. 114-394, at 7 (2016).
199
See, e.g., Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem v. Christies, Inc., No.
98 Civ. 7664 (KMW), 1999 WL 673347 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1999) (holding that
a delay of almost seventy years in bringing a claim prejudiced a family that
possessed a manuscript by making it almost impossible to prove ownership);
Wertheimer v. Cirker’s Hayes Storage Warehouse, 752 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1st Dep’t
2002) (dismissing the complaint on grounds of laches because the “uncontradicted
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suspect that art was stolen from them can defeat a laches defense by
showing that they or their family members took affirmative steps
after the war to locate the missing property, including using
“diplomatic channels and other post-war procedures,” “list[ing]
missing or stolen works with appropriate registries, such as
Holocaust related databases and making other efforts to publicize
ownership”
200
and by “continuing to make significant efforts over
time to locate the missing works and expending personal finances to
do so.”
201
The HEAR Act sunsets on January 1, 2027, except that the Act
continues to apply to claims or causes of action pending on that
date.
202
On that date, state statutes of limitations become effective
again in the Nazi-looted art context.
203
In effect, a claimant who did
not or could not bring a claim under the HEAR Act would again be
able to bring a claim under New York State’s demand and refusal
rule.
204
Therefore, the sunset provision preserves New York’s
demand and refusal rule, but delays its potential invocation until
January 1, 2027.
205
This, in the context of cases often beset by laches
defenses,
206
is a nonsensical result that rewards or at least allows
claimants to wait before bringing claims. This runs contrary to the
sensible policy rationale at the heart of laches, which is to avoid
prejudice and unreasonable delay in bringing claims.
207
To avoid this, Congress should amend the HEAR Act by either
carving out New York’s demand and refusal rule, making it so that
evidence establishes that for nearly half a century prior to the commencement of
this action” the plaintiffs did not take any action to recover the paintings).
200
DAVID J. EISEMAN, ART LITIGATION DISPUTE RESOLUTION INSTITUTE
NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS’ ASSOCIATION, PANEL II: COMMENCING AN
ACTION, PART 3: LACHES: THE LATEST TRENDS 4 (2008)
https://www.golenbock.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/Outline_for_Panel_on_Art_Litigation_v2.pdf.
201
Id.
202
Holocaust Expropriated Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 5,
130 Stat. 1524, 1526–28 (2016).
203
Id.
204
See Barnes, supra note 95, at 633.
205
See id.
206
See, e.g., Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186, 197 (2d
Cir. 2019).
207
See Eiseman, supra note 200, at 2.
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claimants in courts applying New York law can choose to apply
either the HEAR Act’s discovery rule or New York’s demand and
refusal rule.
208
Alternatively, Congress could simplify the process
even further by immediately replacing the discovery rule with New
York’s demand and refusal rule, thereby making it so that this
claimant-friendly rule preempts each state’s statute of limitations in
the Nazi-looted art context, without a sunset provision. Doing so
better preserves Congress’ stated goals of ensuring that claimants
have a chance to adjudicate Nazi-looted art cases on their merits
whenever possible.
IV. PURELY PROCEDURAL PREEMPTION: IS THEHEARACT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
There is a relatively new argument,
209
based primarily on non-
commandeering principles laid out in New York v. United States
210
and Printz v. United States,
211
that the HEARAct is unconstitutional
because it violates Tenth Amendment principles of federalism by
preempting a state cause of action on a purely procedural basis
without a sufficiently larger “overall regulatory scheme that enables
plaintiffs to vindicate their substantive rights.”
212
Indeed, the
language of the HEAR Act expressly does not create a federal cause
of action,
213
does not provide any binding or clarifying language on
choice of law analyses, and establishes no separate elements of
proof or any other semblance of a larger regulatory structure
208
E.g., Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 77 N.Y.2d 311 (N.Y.
Ct. App. 1991); see N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214 (McKinney 1996).
209
See Charron, supra note 43.
210
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (finding that
Congress is forbidden from directly compelling states to “enact and enforce a
federal regulatory program”).
211
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that certain
provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act violated the Tenth
Amendment).
212
Charron, supra note 43, at 51.
213
“Rule of Construction—Nothing in this Act shall be construed to create a
civil claim or cause of action under Federal or State law.” Holocaust Expropriated
Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 5, 130 Stat. 1524, 1526–28 (2016).
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regarding restitution of Nazi-looted art.
214
Instead, it purely
preempts state statutes of limitations in a narrow area of property
disputes.
215
Without more regulatory structure, it is, at the very least,
unclear as to whether the HEARAct
216
is constitutional in its current
form.
217
Accordingly, a defendant seeking to maintain possession of
property falling under the purview of the HEAR Act may seek to
have a judge find the HEAR Act unconstitutional.
218
That said,
however,
[i]t is equally settled that Congress can mandate
certain procedural rules to implement substantive
federal rights and causes of action that Congress has
created, and Congress may likewise preempt any
conflicting state procedural rules that could frustrate
the federal right. The question in such cases
is whether the procedural rule is “part and parcel of
the remedy afforded” by the federal cause of action
itself.
219
In other words, Congress would have to amend the HEAR Act to
first create a federal cause of action (say, restitution for Nazi-looted
art, as defined in the HEAR Act statute); then Congress might be
able to mandate certain procedural rights to implement the
substantive cause of action that the HEAR Act created by its
language.
220
CONCLUSION
The HEAR Act passed the Senate with unanimous bipartisan
support.
221
It seeks to gives claimants an opportunity to regain
214
Charron, supra note 43, at 26.
215
Holocaust Expropriated Recovery Act of 2016 §§ 2-5.
216
Id.
217
Id.; Charron, supra note 43, at 67.
218
Charron, supra note 43, at 67.
219
Charron, supra note 43, at 26–27; see Bailey v. Cent. Vt. Ry., 319 U.S.
350, 354 (1943).
220
Charron, supra note 43, at 67.
221
JTA, U.S. Senate Passes Bill to Help Recover Nazi-Looted Art, N.Y.
JEWISH WK. (Dec. 11, 2016, 6:09 PM), http://jewishweek.timesofisrael.com/u-s-
senate-passes-bill-to-help-recover-nazi-looted-art/#KcV8qFRc800Vk25i.99.
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certain property stolen during the Nazi era by imposing a national
regime of statutes of limitations which revives claims that were
previously barred by restrictive state statutes of limitations that do
not account for the particular facts of a genocide, sowing uncertainty
into the restitution process in unprecedented ways.
222
Almost three
years to the day since the HEAR Act’s passage, its effect on suits––
many of which are still pending
223
—is still unclear, though it played
a central and surprising role in Reif v. Nagy,
224
which may bode well
for future claimants. Moreover, even if the HEAR Act itself does
not provide a boost in litigation, it may well bring defendants to the
negotiating table outside of court, now that previously time-barred
claims have been resuscitated in certain instances and claimants can
use the threat of litigation as leverage in dealing with especially
obstinate defendants.
225
If one thing is clear, however, it is that restitution in the Nazi-
looted art context is incredibly complex and fact-specific. The law
has certainly struggled to provide justiciable standards to provide
certainty and predictability in this field. Indeed, one observer
recently wrote that “[f]ew issues appear as ethically clear-cut and
yet persistently intractable as the restitution of art looted during
World War II.”
226
Would-be claimants face significant obstacles,
procedural and otherwise, when they seek restitution of property in
this context.
227
The HEAR Act is borne of laudable goals,
228
but as
222
See Holocaust Expropriated Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308,
§ 5, 130 Stat. 1524, 1526–28 (2016); Hoenig, supra note 13.
223
See, e.g., Philipp v. Fed. Republic of Ger., 894 F.3d 406, 418 (D.C. Cir.
2018); Gowen v. Helly Nahmad Gallery, Inc., 77 N.Y.S.3d 605, 632 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2018).
224
Reif v. Nagy, 80 N.Y.S.3d 629, 633 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018) (holding that
plaintiffs brought timely action under the HEAR Act and that defendants’ statute
of limitations defense was insufficient).
225
Barnes, supra note 95, at 634.
226
Kaplan, supra note 171.
227
See Hoenig, supra note 13.
228
See Holocaust Expropriated Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308,
§ 3, 130 Stat. 1524, 1525–26 (2016) (stating that the purpose of the HEAR Act is
to “ensure that claims to artwork and other property stolen or misappropriated by
the Nazis are not unfairly barred by statutes of limitations but are resolved in a
just and fair manner”).
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a review of even the recent cases in New York shows,
229
the Act is
more often sidelined or not even mentioned in cases where some of
its proponents might have foreseen it taking a more central role.
230
Reif provides hope,
231
but it is unclear whether it is an outlier or a
real harbinger of changes to come.
One way the HEAR Act
232
might assume a more central role is
by actually creating a federal cause of action and expanding the
regulatory structure by which it controls the adjudication of Nazi-
looted art claims, given the states’ proven inability to adjudicate
these claims on their merits in any uniform way.
233
These
amendments should involve an immediate change to the statute of
limitations in the HEAR Act
234
from the current discovery rule to a
New York-style demand and refusal rule. This would also mean that
the limitations would not sunset after an arbitrary number of years.
Legislators might also consider the Hulton v.
Staatsgemaldesammlungen court’s suggestion that an exception be
created to the FSIA that implements “[a] carve-out for victims . . . to
take action against the downstream beneficiaries of . . . policies” that
provide immunity to state actors, even where sales under duress
could be proven,
235
though that would likely require an amendment
to the FSIA, not the HEAR Act in its current (or even expanded)
form.
If Congress did indeed seek to create more uniformity and
certainty around Nazi-era art restitution cases, the HEAR Act,
236
almost three years in, is not living up to its billing. By interfering
229
Cf. Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186, 197 (2d Cir.
2019) (affirming lower court decision, but specifically noting that the HEAR Act,
by its amended language, leaves open the option for defendants to assert laches
and other equitable defenses). See generally Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art,
307 F. Supp. 3d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (making no mention of the HEAR Act’s
recent passage while engaging in thorough choice of law analysis between Italian
and New York law).
230
Kaplan, supra note 171.
231
SeeMcBride et al., supra note 51.
232
Holocaust Expropriated Recovery Act of 2016 §§ 2-5.
233
Barnes, supra note 95, at 621.
234
Holocaust Expropriated Recovery Act of 2016 §§ 2-5.
235
Hulton v. Bayerische Staatsgemaldesammlungen, 346 F. Supp. 3d 546,
551 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
236
Holocaust Expropriated Recovery Act of 2016 §§ 2-5.
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with state statutes of limitations in an uncertain way for a short,
arbitrary period of time, the Act may end up creating more problems
than it solves. But the solution is not to repeal the law and return
these issues to the states. Instead, Congress should seek to build out
the HEAR Act’s regulatory structure even further,
237
in a way that
accounts for particular facts of history’s most extraordinary
displacement of works of art
238
and honors the original goals of the
HEAR Act’s passage—to adjudicate claims in the Nazi-looted art
context on the merits of those claims.
239
237
Id.
238
BAZYLER, supra note 2.
239
Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 5.
